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Personal liability for negligent mis statements
by Paul Heatherington
The managing director of a franchisor 
company incorporated with limited 
liability has been held personally liable 
for making negligent misstatements to a
o o o
prospective franchisee in Williams v Natural 
Life Health Foods Ltd [1997] BCC 605. In 
this note, I shall explain the facts of the 
case and summarise the law. I shall then 
analyse the implications of the decision 
to the franchise community.
THE FACTS .
In October 1987, the plaintiffs, David 
Williams and Christine Reid, opened a 
health food shop in Rugby. They traded 
under franchise from Natural Life Health 
Foods Ltd (Natural Life). They had 
decided to go ahead because of a 
franchise brochure which gave details ofo
Richard Mistlin's experience. Richard 
Mistlin was the founder of Natural Life. 
Apart from a nominal holding by Mrs 
Mistlin, the sole shareholder of Natural 
Life was Richard Mistlin. The 
negotiations for the sale of the franchise
o
were mainly carried out by a non- 
shareholder director of Natural Life who 
was paid by commission. The financial 
projections which were prepared were 
substantially overstated. The forecast 
profit on expected sales for an 18-month 
period to April 1988 was projected at 
£430,250. The sales achieved were 
£248,000. The actual trading loss was 
£38,000.
The plaintiffs sued Natural Life for 
their losses of £84,641. When Natural 
Life, a limited liability company, was
dissolved, Richard Mistlin was joined in 
the action as a second defendant. The 
plaintiffs then went ahead with their 
action against Richard Mistlin alone.
Langley J delivered the judgment at 
first instance. At the trial Richard Mistlin 
did not give evidence. In the course of 
the trial there was no real explanation to 
justify the projected sales turnover 
figures. Richard Mistlin himself had run a 
health food business in Salisbury but this 
was his own shop and it did not belong to 
Natural Life. When the financial 
projections were given to the plaintiffs, 
Natural Life had no other franchisees 
with any relevant experience to provide a 
basis for the projections.
The total damages awarded to the 
plaintiffs were £149,854.15 which 
included interest of £65,2 13.15.
THE APPEAL
Natural Life had persuaded the 
plaintiffs to enter into, first, the franchise 
agreement with Natural Life and,
o
secondly, a lease for a health food shop in 
Rugby relying on financial projections 
produced by Natural Life. The question 
for the Court of Appeal was whether 
Richard Mistlin was personally liable for 
those negligent misstatements.
The relevant law falls into two 
categories: negligent misstatements and 
the personal liability of a company 
director. There is little to say about the 
issue of negligent misstatements so far aso o
the company is concerned. Natural Life 
was held to be in breach of its duty of 
care to the plaintiffs under the principles 
laid down in Hedley Byme &^Co Ltd v Heller &^ 
Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 and Esso 
Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon (1976) 1 QB 801. 
Hedley Byrne applies to negligent 
statements of facts. £550 Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Mardon further extends the doctrine to 
negligent forecasts.
On the issue of personal liability of 
directors, a number of authorities were 
considered. Giving the first of the threeo
appeal judgments, Hirst LJ noted that a 
company director is not usually liable for 
negligent misstatements made by his
o o J
company (Wah Tat Bank v Chan Cheng Kum
[1975] AC 507) and could only be fixed 
with personal liability if he assumed 
personal responsibility for negligent 
misstatements made on behalt of a 
company: Performing Pdghts' Society v Ciryl 
Theatrical Syndicate Ltd (1924) 1 KB 1. 
Hirst LJ emphasised that, particularly in 
the case of a one-man company, the court 
must take care to avoid nullifying the 
protection a company director would 
otherwise have resulting from the 
incorporation as a company Salomon v A 
Saloman S^Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. But, it was 
held, if some special circumstances can be 
established, a plaintiff can, even in the case 
of a one-man company, pierce the veil of 
incorporation and establish personal 
liability on the part of a director: Fairline 
Shipping Corp v Adamson [1975] QB 180.
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
It is a question of fact and degree 
whether special circumstances for this 
purpose can be established in any case. In
NOTE ON PILOT UNITS
Ethical franchising requires the franchisor to 
have successfully operated a business concept 
for a reasonable time in at least one pilot unit 
before it begins franchising. This means that 
a business concept should have been 
developed and shown to be successful so that 
profits earned are sufficient to provide a 
reasonable return on the franchisee's 
investment and to enable the franchisee to 
pay fees to the franchisor so that the 
franchisor earns sufficient to operate 
profitably
this case, the court decided that the sales 
projections were based on the personal 
abilities of Richard Mistlin and not on his 
experience as managing director of 
Natural Life, the franchisor company. In 
other words, Natural Life was selling the 
experience and expertise obtained by 
Richard Mistlin in his own Salisbury 
business. Giving the leading judgment, 
Hirst LJ stated:
'From what then was this knowledge and 
experience derived? Not, be it emphasised, jrom 
any company activity, since none of the other 
Jranchised shops had accumulated any 
experience, but rather Jrom Mr Mistlin's 
personal experience in the Salisbury shop ('the 21
pilot unitjbr the company's franchise network') 
which was owned and run by him personally 
and which had nothing whatsoever to do with 
his position as a director of the company. In 
other words the relevant knowledge and 
experience was entirely his qua Mr Mistlin, and 
not his cjua director. Indeed I would go so Jar 
as to say that, in reality, Mr Mistlin held 
himself out as personally responsible for the 
only available figures to support the projections, 
as was indeed thejact.'
In concluding his judgment Hirst LJ 
expressed the view that there was no risk, 
on the particular facts of this case, of 
compromising the general concept of 
limited liability. Waite LJ agreed. A 
dissenting judgment was delivered by Sir 
Patrick Russell.
Few franchisees who fail in business 
blame themselves. All franchisors run the 
risk of claims arising out of pre- 
contractual representations which they 
make to prospective franchisees either in 
pre-contract documentation such as 
franchise brochures, or in negotiations.
' o
Larger organisations may have difficulty 
controlling what may be said by a range
of staff from the telephone receptionist 
to the franchise sales director. The 
Natural Life case points out that smaller 
franchisors have a higher exposure risk. 
This case does turn on its facts to some 
extent. The franchisor company was in its 
infancy. It had no real experience. The 
experience it offered to prospective 
franchisees was that of the single
o
founding director. Its marketingo o
literature claimed experience it did not 
have. When the financial projections 
were provided to the plaintiffs, the 
franchisor company had no other 
franchisees with any relevant experience 
to provide a basis for them.
For new businesses who want to 
franchise, this case sends these messages:
  learn about franchising before selling 
franchises;
  sell the franchises yourself. Do not use 
intermediaries;
  only claim that you have a proven 
system if you actually do have one;
  do not pluck sales figures out of the air 
and dress them up as profit forecasts. 
For a franchisee the most important 
factor when he buys will be working 
out realistic and supportable
projections for sales, expenses and 
profits. No franchisee has the 
experience to do this. It is only a 
franchisor who is able to supply 
accurate information, with appropriate 
clarifications and disclaimers;
  officers of a company should avoid 
making statements in a personal 
capacity. @
FRANCHISORS' RISK
Few franchisees who fail in business blame 
themselves. All franchisors run the risk of 
claims arising out of pre-contractual 
representations which they make to 
prospective franchisees either in pre- 
contract documentation such as franchise 
brochures, or in negotiations. Larger 
organisations may have difficulty controlling 
what may be said by a range of staff from the 
telephone receptionist to the franchise sales 
director.
Paul Heatherington
Evershcds (AeivaJit/e upon Tyne)
Trusts & Equity
How dumb is the blind trust?
A common phenomenon in the 
modern offshore trust world is the so- 
called blind trust. Typically, a nominal 
trust fund   say £10   is declared by a 
professional offshore trustee to be held 
on the terms of a lengthy and 
sophisticated trust deed. In substance, 
this amounts to discretionary trusts of 
income and capital, during the longest 
period allowed by the governing law, for 
the benefit of a defined class of objects. 
Again typically this class at the outset 
contains only one or two members. They 
will be charities of worldwide reputation, 
such as the International Red Cross.
The trust deed also confers power on 
the trustee to add further persons to the 
class. Some time after the original 
declaration of trust, the settlor decants 
substantial wealth into the hands of the 
trustee, on the same trusts. But, because 
the original deed is a unilateral
o
declaration of trust by the trustee, the
by Paul Matthews
identity of this real settlor nowhere 
appears. Later still, the trustee   at the 
'suggestion' of the settlor   appoints 
persons, who just happen to be his or her 
relatives or even himself or herself, into 
the class of objects, and then   surprise, 
surprise   the trustee appoints significant 
wealth out of the trust fund to them.
Such trusts have been known in the 
offshore world for years (see eg Re Gea 
Settlement, 17 March 1992, Royal Court 
of Jersey). Those who promote such 
trusts say they are cheap to set up, 
flexible, and may prevent intended 
beneficiaries having too many rights until 
appointed into the class (compare West v 
Lazard Brothers &^ Co (Jersey) Limited 
1987-88 JLR N-22). All true. They are 
also a godsend to the shifty, the secretive 
and the downright fraudulent. And in any 
event the bit about charity is almost 
certainly a sham. In bad cases the whole 
thing will be.
TRUST'S DISSERVICE
But my purpose here is not to point 
out these obvious truths. It is to say that, 
even if the blind trust is utterly genuine, 
it may do a real disservice to those who 
create it. This is illustrated by a recent 
decision of the Isle of Man Court of 
Appeal (actually called the Staff of 
Government Division), Ahuja v Scheme 
Manager, Depositor's Compensation Scheme (8 
April 1997, unreported).
Here a blind trust was set up in 1989 
by eight persons, all related. Unusually, 
two of them appeared in the trust as 
settlors and trustees. But essentially it 
was a nominal sum held on discretionary 
trusts for a class which, at the date of 
setting up, contained only one object, 
namely the International Red Cross. This 
was also the beneficiary in default of 
appointment. One week after being 
created, two events occurred. First, the
